

Contribution to „Victory in Europe & the Road Ahead“

Challenges of the new Dimensions of Security - an analytical view -

Compared to today's security situation and from the view of a NATO member, the cold war period was relatively stable and predictable – with some apocalyptic perspectives though. Looking back, this epoch was balanced by two powers applying a similar rationale of threat assessment and strategy despite substantial differences in their goals and objectives, but the opponents were obliged to similar cultural roots. Since the “fall of the Wall” almost all parameters characterizing security, threats and vulnerabilities have drastically changed into the uncertain. All relevant forces of policy, society and economy are challenged to find adequate ways to cope.

The Threat

Cold war scenarios used to be characterized by a massive two sided military confrontation with – to some extent “predictable” outcome. The numerous scenario models and games exercised, including the nuclear option, obviously contributed to the conclusion on both sides that a war between the blocks of NATO and the Warsaw Pact was not really attractive to either side.

After this threat had vanished, it took years for the armed forces and organisations to transform. Before any physical and organisational transformation can be planned and implemented, the transformation of rethinking and the perception of new threats, scenarios and missions have to mature. Today we are facing a wide spectrum of threats and risks with a massive change of paradigms, diversification of required capabilities, and increasing uncertainties about future developments.

The threat spectrum, today's and future security and defense policy, plans, and measures will have to anticipate ranges from natural and man made disasters, pandemics, international organised crime to terrorism of the various kinds, the military option of states particularly those failing to establish stable political and economic systems, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and hazardous materials and more.

In reality, we have to be prepared for a mixture of several threat categories in an international environment, with high uncertainty about which type of conflict or disaster will occur at what time in which area of the world. The strict distinction between defence and security, between military and non-military tasks is no longer the appropriate model.

Furthermore the changed perception and understanding of politicians and society, under the influence of world wide acting mass information media – TV and increasingly the internet – are influencing situation assessment, decision processes and security planning. Unfortunately, rationality is increasingly replaced by emotionally motivated political decision and action, not only on the side of the so called evil.

Vulnerabilities and Risks

In the same period of consideration, since the end of World War II, the vulnerabilities of societies have dramatically changed, again both, in the real world and the one perceived by political leaders and by the society.

This is belayed in a number of factors which include

- Highly vulnerable infrastructures of supplies like water, energy, food
- Infrastructures providing basic services of transportation, health care, telecommunications
- Commercial and industry sections like the financial sector, large globally operating industries, the information and entertainment media
- The concentration of population density, e.g. in coastal and in metropolitan areas
- The decreasing stability of ecological/environmental systems

The forecast of potential damages and risks is almost impossible due to the uncertainty of specific scenarios to occur and due to the complexity of the systems which might be subjects of attacks.

Consequently, the scope of damages, depending on the type of threat and targets, will cover a wide range from the impairment of health and loss of lives, all facettes of short and long term economical damages up to the hampering of functionality of important administration and security services and even the impact on the sovereignty of states.

These effects will be even enforced by two phenomena: The physical propagation of damages through the highly netted and interdependent systems, and the propagation of consequential effects like loss of market shares or confidence in political and economic systems, shortages of vital supplies or environmental hurts with heavy impact on the quality of life.

These drastic changes in paradigms – a wide new and developing spectrum of threats meeting a large spectrum of vulnerabilities in a globally interconnected and interdependent environment - poses absolutely new challenges to how nations and international organisations and frameworks will have to prepare for and react of security events with catastrophic scale.

The Reality

There is a major disconnect between western states on how to treat states with developing threat potential. Nevertheless, in ad hoc situations like the terror assault of 9/11 or the tsunami disaster of Christmas 2004 we realize a high willingness of nations for cooperation and mutual support. But effective international cooperation requires both, the willingness to help, of the ones who are not affected and the willingness of the ones who suffer, to accept help. This was not always the case in the past.

The new threat and security challenges are on the agenda of all major international organisations. NATO has started the transformation process and develops concepts for the fight against terrorism and for its contribution to critical infrastructure protection. G8 has established a security program, the UN have passed several resolutions and show increasing presence in crisis situations around the world. Nevertheless, a global strategic program on security and defense which embraces all or at least a major fraction of the international organisations and the community of states is still missing. Even many individual states are still lacking an integrative security strategy.

Concrete measures and actions, unfortunately, are mostly limited to reactions on specific events such as the engagement in Afghanistan. Tsunamis as another example for mismatched political and operational preparedness occur in cycles of decades or centuries. A warning system for a conceivable disaster has to be established when the technology is available, not 3 weeks after the catastrophic event. Mankind should remember that already some 4000 years ago Noah built his ark duly in advance of the great flood.

The Requirement for Transformation

A Global Integrative Security Strategy is required, meaning that present and developing threats in a world of increasing vulnerability and diverse perceptions of damage effects require a new approach to security which at least should try to establish commonly accepted principles of thinking, planning and implementing security programs and measures at a global scale.

This process will require an adequate political framework and mechanisms for reliable timely funding and realisation. It should include all major forces – security and defense – and all communities of security stakeholders:

- International organisations for the preparation of rules and regulations of cooperation, and of planning and execution of international missions, and for developing international contractual frameworks and behavioural codexes
- National politicians and legislation to prepare and pass appropriate decisions and an appropriate legal basis, respectively,
- National and international intelligence and investigative organisations for the establishment of information harmonisation, of information sharing processes, and early warning
- The armed forces and the emergency and law enforcement services for specifying requirements and implementing systems, strategies and interoperability
- The security industry – in cooperation with national and international investment and incentive programs – to develop advanced solutions and harmonised standards for security systems like sensors and surveillance, command, control and communication systems, data bases, ground/air/sea/space vehicles etc.
- The research community to develop sound and validated theories, methodologies, tools and technologies for threat analysis, evaluation of preventive and reactive doctrines, for training, education and awareness raising
- Geographical and geo-spacial organisations for information sharing, establishment and operation of early warning systems for natural threats and disaster events.

An Approach to Global Homeland Security

Threats and risks originate from globally distributed sources. Vulnerabilities of systems and societies are complex and hard to predict. Effects – in cases of major attacks or unintended catastrophic hazards - are propagating worldwide through the netted technical, economical and societal systems, immediately as well as through longer term consequential damages.

Individual players – industries – states – regional organisations – are overcharged with handling more-than-local events. The globe is more and more becoming the homeland for all. Effects at one corner in the world produce impacts in many others around the globe. Politicians are realising this changed environment. Some have begun asking for and

speaking about “global politics of home affairs”¹ to become necessary. This is driven mainly by the cognition about two variables governing our world’s fortunes:

- The globalisation of markets, finance and production
- The requirement for a global security process.

A global security system will only be achieved in a medium-to-long-term time frame via a considerably established process. It should include as many as possible states and international bodies.

The UN could act as a global initiator, facilitator and coordinator. Organisations like OSCE and G8 or the Council of Europe could serve as supporting networks and leverages for the implementation of measures. Financial and Economic organisations such as IMF, World Bank, possibly EFTA, WTO, APEC etc. should re-evaluate their agenda under the aspects of global security requirements of financing and supporting security programs and projects, regulating the trade of goods which are relevant to security in a positive as well in a negative sense, and for fostering technical and regulatory standards for security. NGOs should become part of the process.

Global commercial players must have substantial interest in improved global security which will not only better protect their assets but will also be required for reliable global business continuity. Industries should be willing to actively contribute to a global security process through appropriate boards or associations, both by financial contributions as well as by actively participating in prevention and reaction/recovery networks.

The European Union will develop to a major regional integrator of security in Europe – military and non military -. The EU has a unique chance to fulfil a leading role in security with planning and managing security missions that cannot be performed by individual member states or pure military alliances alone. As a long term vision, the EU could serve as a role model of and facilitator for a global peaceful consolidation and cooperation of states under the umbrella of commonly agreed laws and rules.

Last but not least, NATO is the strongest military organisation of the world which proved its right of existence and its performance during the cold war, and which has demonstrated the capability to transform thereafter. Its viable role in a global security framework should be the extension of its regional character into global responsibilities (which is well under way) – if NATO should succeed to solve world wide security issues cooperatively instead of dominant approaches of a few. Under these conditions NATO could also develop into the leading organisation which is able to perform the integration of defense and security (non-military) forces on the operational and maybe also on the system and technology level, and to have the leading or preferred option for planning and executing security missions around the world. This will, however, require a revised transatlantic harmonisation of global objectives, roles and values.

The principles of a “Global Homeland Security” should be laid down in a commonly agreed convention followed by a common governance code, with the absolute obligation of all that the damage to one will never be exploited to the benefit of others. The principles of security cooperation should be sharing of verified information and sharing of workload based on common decisions. A global security partnership should regard the different levels of financial strength of countries and regions. It must not in any case foster the military and security dominance of individual nations. It could have the chance for maximising peace on this Globe.

¹ In German „Weltinnenpolitik“